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Abstract 
This paper investigates the relationship between human capital and the ancestral 
genetic diversity of populations. A simple model highlights a new channel through 
which genetic diversity can affect development: human capital. Additionally, 
empirical evidence of an unconditional hump-shaped relationship between genetic 
diversity and human capital is documented. This relationship decreases statistical 
significance when other deeply rooted determinants of human capital are taken into 
account. However, we found some significantly positive (linear) effects of genetic 
diversity. Thus, if there is a relationship between genetic diversity and human 
capital, this relationship tends to be positive: more genetic diversity is beneficial to 
human capital. 
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determinants of human capital. 
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1 Introduction 
The determinants of human capital have been reported very little in the literature. 
Although there is a huge literature on the determinants of schooling linked with quality 
of schooling, finding a weak causality between inputs to schooling and educational 
achievements, there are not many contributions that explore the deeply-rooted 
determinants of investment on the quantity and quality of human capital. In fact, 
Hanushek and Woessmann (2011) concluded that there is very little evidence in support 
of the influence of inputs in cross-country differences in schooling achievements while 
recognizing the essential effects of family and social background and of some country-
specific school-related institutions. For example, Sequeira and Ferraz (2009) and 
Sequeira (2009) highlight the significant effect that country-risk has in education 
measures, and Galor and Klemp (2014) analyse the biocultural origins of human capital 
formation, using an extensive genealogical record for nearly half a million individuals in 
Quebec from the 16th to the 18th century, highlighting the importance of the choice toward 
child quality in the process of evolution of human capital through history.  
However, the literature on the deeply-rooted determinants of development has been 
greatly developed in the last decade. Hall and Jones (1999) demonstrated the importance 
of social infrastructure, a composite measure of law of rule and other institutional 
measures, which was then followed by Glaeser et al. (2004). It is interesting to note that 
Glaeser’s paper highlights the role of human capital as a more significant source of 
growth than institutions but does not show any causal relationship between institutions 
and human capital. Rodrick et al. (2004) showed evidence for the supremacy of 
institutions related to geography and integration as determinants of economic 
development. However, Olsson and Hibbs Jr. (2005) showed the strong influence of 
geographical and biogeographical factors in determining the current level of 
development. In related literature on institutions, Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) and 
Acemoglu et al. (2005) have stressed the role of colonialism, while the effects of 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization were examined by Easterly and Levine (1997) and 
Alesina et al. (2003).5 Moreover, the historical impact of sociocultural factors has been 
highlighted by Barro and McCleary (2003), Tabellini (2008), and Guiso et al. (2009). 
                                                          
5 The influence of genetic diversity on ethnolinguistic fractionalization has been studied by Ahlerup and 
Olsson (2012). 
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Ashraf and Galor’s (2013a) work is probably one of the most influential recent papers 
in the field of economic development.6 Their paper reports a significant relationship 
between genetic diversity determined ancestrally and economic development in the 
present. The paper illustrates the relationship between genetic diversity and development 
through the positive and decreasing effect of genetic diversity on technology and a 
negative effect of genetic diversity on output representing inefficiency in production. The 
hump-shaped empirical relationship exposed by the authors builds on two opposite effects 
of genetic diversity. First, an increase in diversity enhances production possibilities 
because a wider spectrum of traits is more likely to contain those that are complementary 
to the advancement of superior technologies. In fact, some competition for survival, as 
natural selection explains, also increases adaptability and improves the society’s ability 
to successfully introduce new and better technologies. However, after a certain level of 
genetic diversity, further rise would increase the scope for disarray and mistrust, 
increasing the probability of conflict. Recently, Kodila-Tedika and Asongu (2016) 
obtained a negative effect of Genetic Distance on an index of human capital. In robustness 
analysis these authors also show an overall conditional negative relationship with genetic 
diversity. This would imply that more genetic diversity would undoubtfully lead to less 
human capital outcomes.  In our specifications, we do not confirm this result. 
The aim of our paper is to propose an alternative channel through which genetic 
diversity can influence development: human capital. In fact, a wider variety of traits 
enhances the capacity to accumulate different types of skills; also after a certain level of 
genetic diversity the cost to accumulate knowledge increases due, e.g., to the adaptation 
of curricula and school routines to serve special needs and diverse cultural backgrounds 
and the possibility of conflicts between groups in the school context. The relationship 
between human capital and genetic diversity will emerge from the interplay of those 
opposing forces. Our paper exhaustively describes the empirical relationship between 
several measures of human capital and genetic diversity and tests its robustness in a cross-
section of countries. To that end and to avoid bias associated with the choice of controls, 
which might be interpreted as pursuing significant effects, we strictly follow the 
specifications in Ashraf and Galor (2013a). 
                                                          
6 The paper was a lead article in the American Economic Review and was the Science Editor’s Choice in 
September 2012. 
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In Section 2 we review the literature that relates genetic features and particularly 
genetic diversity with human capital. In Section 3 we devise a simple model in which the 
idea of the relationship between genetic diversity and human capital is presented. In 
Section 4 we present the main empirical results, subject to a number of extensions and 
robustness tests. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 Genetic Diversity and Human Capital: A Literature 
Review 
The influence of genetic traits on school achievement has been discussed in the 
psychology and medicine sciences.  The behavioural sciences have emerged from an era 
of strict environmental explanations for differences in behaviour to a more balanced view 
that recognizes the importance of nature (genetics) as well as nurture (environment). On 
the evaluation of the relative strength of nature and nurture in school achievements, Petril 
et al. (2004) presented evidence on intraclass correlations, which reflected considerable 
genetic influence at each age and modest shared environmental influence within and 
across ages. Plomin and Craig (2001) support that general cognitive ability, a key factor 
in learning and memory, is among the most inheritable of behavioural traits. General 
cognitive ability is partially determined by a network of genes. Thus, the authors argue 
that multivariate genetic research contradicts the idea that genes work on specific 
cognitive processes, but are instead complementary in forming the general cognitive 
ability. Hill et al. (2014) showed that differences in general cognitive ability (intelligence) 
account for approximately half of the variation in any large battery of cognitive tests and 
are predictive of important life events including health. According to the same authors, 
genome-wide analyses of common single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNP) indicate that 
they jointly tag between a quarter and a half of the variance in intelligence. However, no 
single polymorphism has been reliably associated with variation in intelligence. It 
remains possible that these many small effects might be aggregated in networks of 
functionally linked genes. Rietveld et al. (2013) showed three (highly-) statistically 
significant SNPs in explaining differences in schooling A linear polygenic score from all 
measured SNPs accounts for near 2% of the variance, meaning a modest effect of near 1 
month per allele. De Neve et al. (2013) discovered that the leadership tendency may be 
associated with an SNP residing on a neuronal acetylcholine receptor gene (CHRNB3). 
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Shin et al. (2014) showed significant differences on scores obtained on the Korean 
version of modified Mini-Mental State Examination between heterozygotes and 
homozygotes participants (regarding the presence of the apolipoprotein polymorphism), 
effects that vary across ages and levels of education. As human capital is a complex 
concept consisting of different skills that shape human abilities, this reinforces the 
argument toward complementarity of genetic traits in an overall (and maybe non-linear) 
influence on human capital. 
Although the discussion of the relative quantitative effect of genetics on intelligence 
and school achievements will certainly continue in the genetic-related fields, there is now 
some evidence of the (positive) influence of a network of genetic traits on defining the 
human ability to learn. Additionally, genetic influence on achievements may not be 
independent of social background as Tucker-Drob and Harden (2012) had shown. 
However, the exploration of non-linear effects of heterozygosity (genetic diversity) on 
school achievements at the micro-level is clearly overlooked, as the only thinly related 
study is that of Shin et al. (2014), already mentioned. 
Despite the inexistence of much evidence of a negative effect of genetic diversity in 
the schooling outcomes, Kodila-Tedika and Asongu (2016) obtained such a negative 
effect of Genetic Distance on an index of human capital.7 Below we outline evidence of 
the (negative) effects of genetic diversity in school outcomes. For example, Adodo and 
Agbayewa (2011) show that homogeneous ability level grouping is superior for 
promoting students’ learning outcomes. Carter (2003) describes the effects of “black” 
cultural capital in minority students’ outcomes. Thus, greater group diversity has a 
negative effect in schooling outcomes. Does this group diversity include genetic 
diversity? One may argue that the cultural differences between ethnically diverse groups 
are due more to nurture than to nature. Some argue, however, that cultural behaviour may 
also have genetic roots (see e.g., Pyysiäinen and Hauser, 2010 who argue that religion 
may have genetic roots). Some genetic-rooted learning disorders that imply costs to be 
overcome also have quite different prevalence rates among different ethnic groups. 
Examples are autism, attention deficit and hyperactivity syndrome, and handedness (see 
e.g. Korioth, 2014, Akinbami et al., 2011; Johnston et al., 2009 and McManus, 2009). 
Another good example is violence as a consequence of genetic diversity. In fact, Ferguson 
                                                          
7 In fact, in robustness analysis these authors also show an overall conditional negative relationship with 
genetic diversity (working-paper version of the published article, Table 3). 
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and Beaver (2009) stressed that violence is a product of evolution and identified a number 
of polymorphisms associated with violence. Genetically diverse societies are also the 
adequate environment to trigger the natural selection predisposition to violence. It seems 
that the way to address the difficulties in learning in diverse genetic environments has 
been to increase the efforts of educators to compensate for the additional costs of 
education imposed by diversity (see e.g. Terry and Irving, 2010 and Ponciano and 
Shabazian, 2012). 
 
3 Genetic Diversity and Human Capital: A Simple Model 
Consider an illustrative model of an economy in which the supplied stock of human 
capital depends on family h and on inherited general cognitive ability ( , )iF x , a set of 
complementary genetic traits (where 0 1   is the degree of genetic diversity) that 
shape abilities ( ix ) to read and write, logical and calculus skills, creativity, ability to work 
in group, or to lead. General cognitive ability is specified as: 
 ( , ) ,  with 0 1,and 00iF x ix
           (1) 
where ( , ) 0iF x  is an increasing concave function 
2
2
( ) ( )0; 0F F 
 
      
 that 
guarantees the complementarity between the different traits in shaping the general 
cognitive ability. While α assures the concavity of F, θ governs the complementarity 
between the different genetic traits xi. The stock of human capital can be written as: 
 
0
.iH h x
        (2) 
The family decides consumption, c, and human capital effort, h, in order to maximize 
a logarithmic utility as ( , ) ( ) ( )U h c log h log c   subject to a resource constraint
( )cp c p h y  , where y is the family income.8 The family cannot influence the 
genetically-inherited general cognitive ability, but decides its own investment in 
education given the general cognitive ability F. The price of education ( ) 0p    is an 
                                                          
8 The introduction of human capital in the utility function highlights the quantity-quality trade-off and is 
present in economic growth literature (see e.g. Becker et al., 1990 and Clark, 2005). The intuition is that 
the family gains satisfaction from the offspring human capital. For simplification, the family effort on 
human capital is directly converted into useful skills.  
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increasing non-concave function of genetic diversity 
2
2
( ) ( )0; 0p p 
 
      
. This 
feature of the model incorporates the idea according to which increasing genetic diversity 
in the school environment implies diverse genetically-rooted behaviours (e.g. violent 
behaviours) and an increased probability of having at least one element with learning 
disabilities. Those features of increased diverse school environments represent a cost of 
learning associated with adaptation of curricula and routines to people coming from 
different origins, special education services targeting children with special needs, and 
policing services to deter potential violence in schools. As is natural, the properties of 
( )p   guarantee that these types of learning costs are increasing more than proportionally 
to the degree of genetic diversity. This means e.g. that the costs of increasing genetic 
diversity from a relatively homogeneous situation are quite low. Although the family does 
not control genetic diversity, it becomes aware of the cost of education associated with it. 
First-order conditions, after solving in order to h, yields: 
 .
(1 ) ( )
yh
p 


  (3) 
Substituting equation 3 into (2) yields: 
 
0
.
(1 ) ( ) i
yH x
p
 
 
        (4) 
Interestingly, this simple model encompasses important features linking human capital 
and genetic diversity described above. First, it predicts an influence of family income on 
average human capital, which is highlighted by all the human capital theory (see e.g. 
Acemoglu, 2009: Ch. 10). Taken broadly, y can be taken as the family endowments and 
can therefore be interpreted as including also parents’ education. Second, it includes an 
inherited composite measure of complementary genetic traits, generally defined as 
general cognitive ability. Third, it highlights the costs of great genetic diversity to 
education. We now wish to show that equation (4), representing the average supply of 
human capital, is such that it has a maximum for a level of genetic diversity 0 1  . 
The first-order condition for this maximization problem yields: 
 
0
( ) 1 0.
( )
i
i
xp
p x

 
 
 
  
  
  
  (5) 
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Without loss of generality, we assume that each trait has equal contribution to the general 
cognitive ability and thus ix x . Using this generalization and multiplying equation (5) 
by 𝜔 > 0 the first-order condition is simplified to: 
 
( ) 0
( )
p
p
  
 
  

,  (6) 
which implies that ( )0 1
( )
p
p
 
 
 

, meaning that the percentage variation of the price 
due to a percentage variation in genetic diversity must be equal to 0 1.    
Second-order condition to a maximum is the following: 
 
2
2 2
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ,
( ) ( )
pp p p
p p
    
   
              
   
  (7) 
which is always negative at the extremum given by (5), given the properties of ( )p  .9 
Note that if p  is not a function of  , then the negative effect of genetic diversity in 
human capital will be nullified. Also, if the maximum value of the function is obtained 
for an   that is above any empirically reasonable value, then the predicted relationship 
will be a positive one between genetic diversity and human capital. 
In the first regressions of the empirical part of the paper we find the value of 0.7   
as the proportion of genetic diversity that maximizes human capital, meaning that above 
this value, more genetic diversity will deter human capital. We will give some examples 
of functional forms for ( )p   for which a reasonable value of the share of the general 
cognitive ability   may replicate empirically the proportion of genetic diversity that 
maximizes human capital. 
                                                          
9 This is a model for the supply of human capital, as empirical evidence is based on variables mostly linked 
with the supply side of the market for human capital. If one plugs y from the model of Ashraf and Galor 
(2013a) into equation (4) the same hump-shaped relationship between human capital and genetic diversity 
appears given certain conditions. If alternatively to what Ashraf and Galor (2013a) did, we modelled y 
dependent on human capital, we may also consider that genetic diversity contributes to decrease the 
productivity of human capital, in an efficiency argument similar to the one used in their article. So our 
model highlights an alternative channel between genetic diversity and development, through human capital. 
More generally, any model with an  -increasing concave general cognitive ability ( , ) 0iF x   and an 
 -increasing non-concave ( ) 0p    would yield a maximum for   fulfilling (.) / (.) .
(.) / (.)
F F
p p


  
 
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Example 1 Consider that 1( )
1
p 



. Equation (6) yields 1
1




, which is 
between 0.5 and 1. With 0.4286  , genetic diversity that maximizes human capital is
0.7  . 
Example 2 Consider that ( ) 1p    . Equation (6) yields 
1




, which yields 
0.7   for 0.4117  . 
Example 3 Consider that ( )p e  . Equation (6) yields ,   which yields 0.7   
for 0.7  . 
 
If the beneficial effects of genetic diversity dominate at lower levels of diversity and 
the detrimental effects prevail at higher ones (i.e., if there are diminishing marginal 
returns to both diversity and homogeneity), the theory would predict a hump-shaped 
effect of genetic diversity on human capital throughout the development process. 
However, if the predicted value for the theory would be lower than the observed 
maximum for genetic diversity, then a match between theory and data is obtained for 
always positive influence of genetic diversity in human capital. In the empirical findings, 
we will see that the most robust results will point to this last case, i.e., an ever positive 
effect of genetic diversity in human capital. 
 
4 Empirical Findings 
4.1 Data and Sources 
In this section we describe the variables and data sources for the empirical part of this 
work. Our dependent variable is human capital, for which we use two different measures 
– enrolments and scores on international tests. These alternative measures of human 
capital were taken from Cohen and Soto (2007) for measures of quantity of human capital 
and from Hanushek and Woessmann (2012) for measures of the quality of human 
capital.10 In fact, the quality of human capital has been argued to be crucial in explaining 
countries’ different performances (see e.g. Hanushek and Woessmann, 2015). 
Explanatory variables are from the database from Ashraf and Galor (2013a) who 
include variables that measure genetic diversity, as adjusted to migratory movements and 
                                                          
10 A previous working-paper version of this work, which used very different specifications, also included 
different measures of human capital. In that previous and preliminary work, the unconditional hump-shaped 
relationship between genetic diversity and human capital was confirmed for many different proxies for 
quality and quantity of human capital. 
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ancestry adjusted. For our benchmark analysis we use the ancestry adjusted (to 2000) 
predicted genetic diversity. As genetic diversity measured by this variable has been 
adjusted to account for the 2000 composition of populations (that can trace their ancestral 
origins to different source countries in the year 1500) this is the appropriate measure to 
relate to the distribution of human capital in the world after the year 2000. Other 
explanatory variables will be introduced as controls later on.11 
The countries included in our cross-section analysis depend on the availability of 
human capital data and human capital variables.12 
Table 1 summarizes two dependent variables used: school, which measures quantity 
of schooling (years of schooling or attainment) and cogn to measure quality of schooling, 
available as tests scores.  Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the dependent variables. 
The explanatory variables used (predicted genetic diversity ancestry adjusted and 
mobility index-predicted genetic diversity ancestry adjusted) are pdiv_aa and 
pdivhmi_aa, respectively, and measure, as explained above, genetic diversity for 2000. 
Table 1: Human Capital Variables 
Variables for Human Capital 
(HC) Name Measure (years and source) 
Years of schooling of 
population+25 
sch25 1960-2010 (Ashraf and Galor, 2013a) 
Average test score in math 
and science 
cogn primary through secondary, all years 1964-2003 
(Hanushek and Woessmann, 2012) 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  
(a) pdiv_aa  .7267 .0269 .6279 .7743   
 
(b) pdivhmi_aa   .7229 .02904 .6178 .7826  
 
 
(1) sch25 4.8623 2.8126 .4089 10.8622  
(2) cogn 4.5429 .5709 3.0893 5.3376  
Notes: (a) Predicted genetic diversity ancestry adjusted; (b) Mobility index-predicted genetic diversity ancestry adjusted. Ancestry adjustment is 
made to make variables consistent to time-measurement in 2000. Details are given in the Appendix F of Ashraf and Galor (2013a).; (1) Years of 
schooling; (2) Average test score in math and science, primary through end of secondary school, all years (scaled to PISA scale divided by 100) 
 
4.2 Replication of the Ashraf and Galor (2013a) result for Schooling  
In this section we document the fact that there is a hump-shaped relationship between 
different variables linked with human capital (quantity, quality) and the genetic diversity 
                                                          
11 Which has also been done by Ashraf and Galor (2013a) in their Section V. 
12 The largest list of countries used (123) is detailed in the Appendix. Detailed lists of countries for each 
regression are available upon request. 
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of countries. We estimate OLS regressions using exactly the same specifications that 
Ashraf and Galor (2013a) did in their Tables 5 and 6. These regressions through different 
dependent variables predict surprisingly similar maximum values for the genetic diversity 
above which human capital tends to decrease (around 0.70), which is slightly below the 
median value for these variables (see Table 2). This means that there is a quite realistic 
value for genetic diversity below which human capital increases with diversity and above 
which it decreases. Moreover, this result is very similar to that obtained by Ashraf and 
Galor (2013a: Tables 1 and 6) when testing the relationship between genetic diversity and 
development.  
 
Table 3 — Adjusted versus Unadjusted Diversity and Human Capital in 2000 CE 
 (1) 
School 
(2) 
School 
(3) 
School 
 
Predicted Diversity (ancestry adjusted) 
 
1,384.235*** 
(362.968) 
 
466.415* 
(243.292) 
 
Predicted Diversity square (ancestry 
adjusted) 
-985.127*** 
(253.025) 
-322.376* 
(169.360) 
 
Predicted Diversity (unadjusted)   418.792*** (143.100) 
Predicted Diversity square (unadjusted)   -315.152*** (105.655) 
Continent fixed effects No Yes No 
Observations 109 109 109 
R-squared 0.130 0.591 0.0739 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *  p<0.1 
 
According to our estimates in Table 3 (column 1), there is a clear and (unconditional) 
hump-shaped relationship between genetic diversity and schooling. In fact, according to 
these results a 1 percentage point increase in genetic diversity for the country with least 
genetic diversity in the sample would be associated with an increase in schooling of 
around 1.37 years and the same increase for the country with highest genetic diversity 
would be associated with a reduction of roughly 1.51 years of school. These are sizeable 
quantitative effects, representing almost 1/3 of the schooling average value. Moreover, 
the positive effect of increased genetic diversity for lower levels is relatively lower than 
the negative effect of increased genetic diversity for higher levels. The effects calculated 
under the coefficients estimated under regressions presented in Table 3, columns 2 and 3 
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are lower, but by now tend to confirm the strength of the negative effect when compared 
with the positive effect of genetic diversity. 
In Table 4 (replicating Table 6 in Ashraf and Galor, 2013a) we introduce the same 
number of controls in those regressions of Table 3 that they also did. The conclusion is 
that the hump-shaped relationship between genetic diversity human capital vanishes. It is 
worth noting the negative and significant effect of the log of population density in 1500 
in determining schooling nowadays, which may indicate that the process of education 
cannot be rooted in the economic development of the pre-Columbian era. Given the 
results in Table 4, which clearly reject the hump-shaped relationship in Section 4.3, we 
present results of a linear relationship between genetic diversity and two important 
measures of quantity and quality of human capital. This is important in light of the 
possible interpretations of the effect of genetic diversity on different aspects of 
development and in particular in determining if schooling may have reinforcing effects 
of the costs of diversity or on the contrary, some mitigation costs may be hypothesized, 
which we discuss later in the paper. 
Table 4—Diversity and Human Capital in 2000 CE 
 (1) 
School 
(2) 
School 
(3) 
School 
 
Predicted diversity (ancestry adjusted) 
 
43.472 
 
241.739 
 
136.664 
 (220.486) (239.799) (214.954) 
Predicted diversity square (ancestry adjusted) -25.346 -161.391 -95.209 
 (156.414) (169.367) (152.667) 
log Neolithic transition timing (ancestry adjusted)  -1.008 -0.194 
  (0.740) (0.823) 
log Neolithic transition timing (unadjusted) -1.367** 
(0.630) 
  
log percentage of arable land -0.177 -0.108 0.134 
 (0.288) (0.339) (0.331) 
log absolute latitude 0.597** 0.646** 0.412 
 (0.275) (0.287) (0.296) 
log land suitability for agriculture 0.016 0.020 0.198 
 (0.267) (0.287) (0.265) 
log population density in 1500 CE   -0.609** 
(0.242) 
Optimal diversity 0.858 0.749 0.718 
 (3.320) (2.505) (0.706) 
Continent fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 109 109 109 
R-squared 0.644 0.622 0.656 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.3 A Linear Relationship: robustness to other controls 
The results obtained so far mean that the hump-shaped relationship described in the 
previous section is a pattern in data that cannot be regarded as robust to other variables 
determining human capital, and certainly does not resemble the relationship described in 
Ashraf and Galor (2013a) between genetic diversity and development (population 
density). Does this mean that genetic diversity does not contribute to human capital as 
our model describes and some microevidence seem to indicate? In fact, we found some 
evidence of a positive (linear) relationship between predicted genetic diversity, predicted 
using the human mobility index. The human mobility index is the (optimal) average 
migratory distance from Addis Ababa but that takes into consideration the time cost of 
travelling through the earth surface in the absence of steam-powered transportation 
technologies. The optimality of the path is determined by incorporating information on 
natural impediments to human spatial mobility. It is worth noting that the relationship 
between human capital and predicted genetic diversity using the benchmark migratory 
distance that does not incorporate the human mobility index is also statistically significant 
in some specifications considered.13 
Using a sample of 76 and 43 countries (for School and Cognitive as dependent 
variables, respectively) for which data are available for the institutional and cultural 
controls that are employed in the examination, Column 1 of Table 5 (which presents a 
linear version of the specification presented in Ashraf and Galor 2013a, Table 7, for the 
human capital variables as dependent variables) demonstrates that genetic diversity has a 
linear effect on the current levels of schooling, accounting for the set of baseline controls 
employed in the historical analysis, i.e., the logs of the weighted timing of the Neolithic 
transition, the percentage of arable land, and absolute latitude, as well as continent fixed 
effects. The estimated linear coefficients associated with the diversity channel is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level, when dummies are not introduced (Table 5, 
columns (1) to (3)), but its significance decreases when dummies for OPEC countries, 
legal origin, and major religion shares are introduced. Thus the robustness of the influence 
of genetic diversity in schooling is good to the inclusion of a measure of institutional 
quality, as captured by the social infrastructure index of Hall and Jones (1999), but are 
                                                          
13 We are not reporting these results for space considerations but they are available upon request. 
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not to other institutional measures such as legal origin and religion shares. While ethnic 
fractionalization does not indeed confer a significant adverse effect on current levels of 
schooling, the linear impact of genetic diversity remains highly statistically significant 
(column 3). In Table 6 we analyse the effect of genetic diversity on test scores, using the 
same specification as in Table 5, but we have reached a positive and significant effect in 
only one of the specifications. 
However, as established in Tables 7 and 8 (replicating Table 8 in Ashraf and Galor, 
2013a, for the human capital variables), the linear positive effect of genetic diversity 
remains somewhat significant if the sample is restricted to (i) non-OECD economies (i.e., 
economies that were less attractive to migrants) in Column 2, (ii) non-Neo-European 
countries (i.e., excluding the U.S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) in Column 3, 
(iii) non-Latin American countries in Column 4, (iv) non-Sub-Saharan African countries 
in Column 5, and (v) countries whose indigenous population is greater than 97 percent of 
the entire population (i.e., under conditions that virtually eliminate the role of migration 
in contributing to diversity over the last 500 years) in Column 6. The robustness of the 
linear effect of genetic diversity on Cognitive tests on these robustness analyses is 
particularly impressive. Quantitatively, an increase of 0.1 in genetic diversity would 
increase test scores from 0.9 to 2.8 points, quite a significant result given the usual values 
of the test scores (which oscillate from 3.08 to 5.34). On the contrary, the robustness tests 
on the relationship between genetic diversity and schooling show that this relationship is 
robust only to the non-Sub-Saharan African countries in Column 5.  
These results contradict those in Kodila-Tedika and Asongu (2016) and Asongu and 
Kodila-Tedika (2017). In fact, contrary to the results obtained by those authors, a positive 
influence of genetic diversity on human capital outcomes implies that if immigration 
policies that contribute to increase genetic diversities have a significant effect and if this 
relationship will be maintained for the centuries that come, this result should be regarded 
as positive. 
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Table 5—Diversity and Other Determinants of Quantity of Human Capital in 2000 CE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Dependent Variable: School in 2000 CE 
Mobility index predicted 23.305** 24.322*** 24.197*** 14.545* 14.269 7.697 
genetic diversity (9.705) (7.462) (6.455) (8.252) (8.841) (7.466) 
       
log [Neolithic transition -1.541** -0.550 -0.510 0.879 1.078 0.457 
timing] (0.642) (0.672) (0.647) (0.961) (0.948) (0.903) 
       
log [% of arable land] -0.264 -0.126 -0.131 -0.206 -0.166 -0.188 
 (0.195) (0.163) (0.186) (0.195) (0.220) (0.204) 
       
log [Absolute latitude] 0.464 0.412** 0.402* 0.423 0.086 -0.121 
 (0.386) (0.180) (0.244) (0.274) (0.363) (0.297) 
       
Social infrastructure  4.535*** 4.553*** 4.483*** 4.483*** 3.704*** 
  (1.181) (0.971) (0.887) (1.363) (1.315) 
       
Ethnic fractionalization   -0.127 0.016 0.232 0.491 
   (0.787) (0.825) (1.032) (0.886) 
       
% population at risk of     0.426 0.496 
contracting malaria     (1.382) (1.166) 
       
% population living in     -1.413 -1.371** 
tropical zones     (0.925) (0.600) 
       
Mean distance to     -1.066 -0.973 
nearest waterway     (0.860) (0.900) 
       
OPEC fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes 
Legal origin fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Major religion shares No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 76 76 76 76 76 76 
Adj R-squared 0.656 0.750 0.746 0.841 0.855 0.875 
Note: Level of Significance: *** for p-value<0.01; **for p-value<0.05;* for p-value<0.1. Bootstrap standard errors, accounting for the use of 
generated regressors, are reported in parentheses. All regressions include continent dummies. 
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Table 6—Diversity and Other Determinants of Quality of Human Capital in 2000 CE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Dependent Variable: Cognitive 
Mobility index predicted 6.074 7.278 7.913 13.883* 16.304 18.589 
genetic diversity (5.689) (6.741) (5.921) (8.090) (10.378) (14.748) 
       
log [Neolithic transition -0.710** -0.523 -0.418 -0.305 -0.281 -0.247 
timing] (0.349) (0.330) (0.351) (0.433) (0.451) (0.904) 
       
log [% of arable land] 0.125 0.159 0.176* 0.160 0.230 0.245 
 (0.085) (0.128) (0.098) (0.157) (0.155) (0.271) 
       
log [Absolute latitude] 0.043 -0.007 -0.094 -0.215 -0.609 -0.622 
 (0.231) (0.260) (0.178) (0.241) (1.063) (0.929) 
       
Social infrastructure  0.820*** 0.942*** 1.579* 2.247** 2.344 
  (0.275) (0.324) (0.904) (0.902) (1.637) 
       
Ethnic fractionalization   -0.546* -0.360 -0.362 -0.357 
   (0.316) (0.400) (0.564) (0.804) 
       
% population at risk of     0.845 0.759 
contracting malaria     (1.496) (1.491) 
       
% population living in     -1.044 -1.040 
tropical zones     (1.081) (2.039) 
       
Mean distance to     0.165 0.145 
nearest waterway     (0.899) (0.999) 
       
% population of      -0.404 
european descent      (1.551) 
       
OPEC fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes 
Legal origin fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Major religion shares No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 43 43 43 43 43 43 
Adj R-squared 0.557 0.630 0.652 0.683 0.766 0.759 
Note: Level of Significance: *** for p-value<0.01; **for p-value<0.05;* for p-value<0.1. Bootstrap standard errors, accounting for the use of 
generated regressors, are reported in parentheses. All regressions include continent dummies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Addressing Endogenous Post-1500 Migrations and Quantity of Human Capital 
 Full sample Omit OECD countries 
Omit Neo-
European 
countries 
Omit Latin 
American 
countries 
Omit Sub-Saharan 
African countries 
Countries with 
population at least 
97 % indigenous 
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Note: Level of Significance: *** for p-value<0.01; **for p-value<0.05;* for p-value<0.1. Bootstrap standard errors, accounting for the use of 
generated regressors, are reported in parentheses. All regressions include continent dummies. 
Table 8: Addressing Endogenous Post-1500 Migrations and Quality of Human Capital 
 Full sample Omit OECD countries 
Omit Neo-European 
Countries 
Omit Latin 
American 
countries 
Omit Sub-Saharan 
African countries  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
Variable Dependent Variable: Cognitive  
Mobility index predicted 16.304*** 9.483* 15.194*** 28.124*** 16.495***  
genetic diversity (4.535) (4.365) (4.280) (7.675) (4.585)  
log [Neolithic transition -0.281 0.256 -0.291 -0.632** -0.422  
timing] (0.247) (0.261) (0.233) (0.239) (0.277)  
log [% of arable land] 0.230** 0.195** 0.140 0.259** 0.105  
 (0.099) (0.067) (0.104) (0.107) (0.106)  
log [Absolute latitude] -0.609*** -0.887*** -0.611*** -0.800*** -0.588***  
 (0.199) (0.107) (0.172) (0.203) (0.194)  
Social infrastructure 2.247*** 1.822** 1.782*** 1.446** 1.845***  
 (0.386) (0.516) (0.588) (0.628) (0.401)  
Ethnic fractionalization -0.362 -1.386*** -0.312 -0.516 -0.178  
 (0.361) (0.293) (0.302) (0.394) (0.326)  
% population at risk of 0.845 -0.238 1.031* -0.446 1.707**  
contracting malaria (0.587) (0.605) (0.500) (0.768) (0.658)  
% population living in -1.044** -0.731** -1.054*** 0.165 -1.403***  
tropical zones (0.458) (0.261) (0.363) (0.683) (0.325)  
Mean distance to 0.165 -0.572 -0.851* 0.462 0.313  
nearest waterway (0.350) (0.508) (0.409) (0.362) (0.266)  
Observations 43 25 41 36 37  
R-squared 0.883 0.982 0.922 0.918 0.915  
Note: Level of Significance: *** for p-value<0.01; **for p-value<0.05;* for p-value<0.1. Bootstrap standard errors, accounting for the use of 
generated regressors, are reported in parentheses. All regressions include continent dummies. 
4.4 Discussion 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Dependent Variable: School 
Mobility index predicted 14.269** 3.371 7.373 2.754 21.097** 16.869 
genetic diversity (6.851) (7.116) (6.333) (11.212) (8.141) (13.558) 
log [Neolithic transition timing] 1.078 1.419* 0.894 0.512 -0.330 -1.627 
 (0.748) (0.818) (0.700) (0.811) (1.096) (1.089) 
log [% of arable land] -0.166 -0.375** -0.320** -0.223 -0.348* -0.523 
 (0.182) (0.173) (0.144) (0.188) (0.200) (0.164) 
log [Absolute latitude] 0.086 -0.066 -0.069 -0.118 -0.047 -1.081 
 (0.252) (0.278) (0.251) (0.277) (0.332) (0.312) 
Social infrastructure 4.483*** 1.981* 2.009** 1.935* 3.114*** 3.770 
 (0.938) (0.995) (0.871) (1.018) (1.039) (1.724) 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.232 -0.285 0.110 0.406 0.853 -3.167 
 (0.788) (0.891) (0.759) (0.948) (1.057) (0.754) 
% population at risk of 0.426 0.039 0.169 -0.229 -4.765*** 3.836 
contracting malaria (0.882) (1.064) (0.919) (1.183) (1.714) (1.397) 
% population living in -1.413*** -1.450*** -1.456*** -1.252** -2.219*** -2.781 
tropical zones (0.525) (0.517) (0.486) (0.578) (0.641) (0.589) 
Mean distance to -1.066* -1.572*** -1.811*** -1.569** -1.754*** -2.987* 
nearest waterway (0.547) (0.532) (0.527) (0.596) (0.620) (0.458) 
Observations 76 58 74 58 51 22 
R-squared 0.895 0.833 0.901 0.941 0.924 0.999 
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In light of the results that relate genetic diversity to proxies of current economic 
development in a hump-shaped manner (e.g. Ashraf et al., 2014, using night time light 
intensity, Cardella et al., 2018 on financial development; and Sequeira and Santos, 2017 
on the relationship with technological adoption in 1500), ours is one of the first to predict 
(at most) a positive association between genetic diversity and one of the dimensions of 
development, in this case schooling. This means that schooling may have mitigation 
effects on the costs of genetic diversity that were mentioned above. In particular, the cost 
of diversity may be diminished because more interpersonal conflict led by genetic 
diversity may be mitigated by education (Arbatli et al., 2018: Table 11), the cost of 
diversity may be mitigated because of the effect of genetic diversity in fractionalization, 
and the adverse effect of fractionalization on development will be mitigated by education 
(Ashraf and Galor, 2013b); the cost of genetic diversity linked with the emergence of 
autocratic regimes highlighted in Galor and Klemp (2017) may be mitigated by the 
positive effect education may have on democracies.14 As mentioned by Ashraf and Galor 
(2017: 12), “the costs of diversity can be mitigated by modern education systems that 
promote social cohesiveness.” Finally, the positive effect of genetic diversity in 
development tends to be greater in more educated societies, as mentioned in Ashraf and 
Galor (2017: 12). 
 
5 Conclusion 
We investigate the relationship between human capital and the ancestry adjusted 
predicted genetic diversity of populations. The paper highlights a new channel through 
which genetic diversity can affect development: human capital. We have devised a simple 
model in which human capital benefits from an increasing (inherited) variety of genetic 
traits (heterozygosity), which enhance learning abilities. Additionally, a cost of human 
capital that depends increasingly on genetic diversity is essential to depict a negative or 
decreasing relationship between genetic diversity and the human capital supply. This cost 
represents the additional effort economic agents have to support in order to overcome the 
negative influence of very diverse genetic backgrounds on the school environment. 
Despite its simplicity, the model encompasses the interplay between nature and nurture 
                                                          
14 The effect of education on the emergence of democracies (or autocracies) is greatly debated in the 
literature, as well as the effect of democracy on development (see e.g., Sequeira, 2017 and Tavares and 
Wacziarg, 2001).   
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in the human capital supply of the economy, the presence of inherited family genetic 
traits, and the costs of diversity on learning environment. 
We based our empirical study on a database of human capital variables coming from 
Cohen and Soto (2007) for measures of quantity of human capital, and from Hanushek 
and Woessmann (2012) for measures of quality of human capital, and then merged it with 
the database of genetic diversity from Ashraf and Galor (2013a). We found an empirical 
fact describing a hump-shaped relationship between human capital and genetic diversity, 
common to different measures of quantity and quality of human capital. However, when 
submitting this relationship to the presence of different controls (the same controls used 
by Ashraf and Galor, 2013a, Tables 6, 7, and 8) the hump-shaped relationship between 
genetic diversity and human capital vanishes. This means that although we found an 
empirical fact with a relationship between genetic diversity and human capital, genetic 
diversity cannot be regarded as a deeply-rooted determinant of the present levels of 
human capital in a hump-shaped manner as described in Ashraf and Galor (2013a).15 
Then, we analyse a conditional linear relationship between human capital and genetic 
diversity. In most specifications, in which more controls are introduced, the genetic 
diversity coefficients appear to be positive and statistically significant. However, in some 
other specifications we obtained a statistically nonsignificant positive sign. Thus, if there 
is a (causal) relationship between human capital and genetic diversity, it is a positive 
influence of diversity in human capital. This establishes that this relationship is subject to 
the number and type of controls included in the regressions. One of several policy 
implications of our possible positive influence of genetic diversity on human capital 
outcomes is that if immigration and refugees policies that help to increase genetic 
diversity of countries would have a significant effect, it should be a positive (and not a 
negative) one! Moreover, education may have a number of mitigation effects of the 
negative effects of genetic diversity, a role that may be subject to further research, namely 
in more micro or experimental studies.  
When comparing our empirical evidence with the model, we must conclude that the 
positive channel of general cognitive ability in shaping human capital must be much 
stronger than the negative effect of diversity. 
                                                          
15 In Sequeira and Santos (2017) we found that genetic diversity can be regarded as a determinant of 
technological adoption in 1500 in a hump-shaped manner, tending to confirm a positive channel through 
technological progress to development. 
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A Appendix 
A.1 List of countries – largest (123) sample 
Afghanistan; United Arab Emirates; Argentina; Australia; Austria; Burundi; Belgium; 
Benin; Bangladesh; Bulgaria; Bahrain; Bolivia; Brazil; Botswana; Central African 
Republic; Canada; Switzerland; Chile; China; Cameroon; Congo, Rep.; Colombia; Costa 
Rica; Cuba; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Germany; Denmark; Dominican Republic; Algeria; 
Ecuador; Egypt, Arab Rep.; Spain; Estonia; Ethiopia; Finland; Fiji; France; United 
Kingdom; Ghana; Gambia, The; Greece; Guatemala; Guyana; Hong Kong; China; 
Honduras; Croatia; Haiti; Hungary; Indonesia; India; Ireland; Iran; Islamic Rep.; Iraq; 
Israel; Italy; Jamaica; Jordan; Japan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Korea, Rep.; Kuwait; Liberia; 
Libya; Sri Lanka; Lesotho; Lithuania; Latvia; Moldova; Mexico; Mali; Malta; Myanmar; 
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Mozambique; Mauritania; Mauritius; Malawi; Malaysia; Niger; Nicaragua; Netherlands; 
Norway; Nepal; New Zealand; Pakistan; Panama; Peru; Philippines; Papua New Guinea; 
Poland; Puerto Rico; Portugal; Paraguay; Romania; Russian Federation; Rwanda; Sudan; 
Senegal; Singapore; Sierra Leone; El Salvador; Slovak Republic; Slovenia; Sweden; 
Swaziland; Syrian Arab Republic; Togo; Thailand; Tajikistan; Trinidad and Tobago; 
Tunisia; Turkey; Uganda; Uruguay; United States; Venezuela, RB; Vietnam; Serbia and 
Montenegro; South Africa; Congo, Dem. Rep.; Zambia; Zimbabwe. 
 
 
